Evaluation of shipping finished automotive in multimodal containers : a marketing plan for shipping company by Xuan, Xu
World Maritime University
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World
Maritime University
World Maritime University Dissertations Dissertations
2014
Evaluation of shipping finished automotive in
multimodal containers : a marketing plan for
shipping company
Xu Xuan
World Maritime University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations
Part of the Marketing Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-commercial, fair use academic
purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express written permission from the World Maritime University. For more
information, please contact library@wmu.se.
Recommended Citation
Xuan, Xu, "Evaluation of shipping finished automotive in multimodal containers : a marketing plan for shipping company" (2014).
World Maritime University Dissertations. 470.
http://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/470
WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY 
Malmö, Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF SHIPPING FINISHED 
AUTOMOTIVE IN MULTIMODAL CONTAINERS 
 
A Marketing Plan for Shipping Company 
 
By 
 
XU XUAN 
 
People’s Republic of China 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial 
Fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
In 
MARITIME AFFAIRS 
 
(PORT MANAGEMENT) 
 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
Copyright XU XUAN, 2014 
 ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been 
identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been 
conferred on me. 
 
The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not necessarily 
endorsed by the University. 
 
 
(Signature): ..........................................      
 
(Date): .......................................... 
 
 
 
Supervised by: * 
World Maritime University                                   
 
 
Assessor: * 
Institution/organisation:  
 
 
Co-assessor: * 
Institution/organisation:  
(* Insert names only here) 
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I am sincerely grateful to my employer China Shipping (Group) Company and China 
Shipping Container Line, for supporting me purse the postgraduate studies at WMU, as 
well as to all the WMU professors and faculties for their great teaching and help. 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Shuo Ma, for his 
excellent guidance, patience, and sharing his rich experiences with me. Enlightened by 
Professor Ma during his lecture of Maritime Logistics and Marketing, I started to study 
on the topic of container car shipping. When I talked to him about my intention to write 
a dissertation on this topic, he gave me great encouragement and important suggestions 
to start the research. After that every time we met, I could always harvest constructive 
ideas. At the same time, he always respected my voice and gave me great freedom to 
purse independent work. Deep thanks also go to Professor Clive Cole, who helped me 
with the linguistic corrections on this dissertation, and Professor Daniel Moon, for his 
kind help and advice during my study in the Port Management specialization. 
 
Also I would like to thank my China Shipping colleagues, Chen Qi, Mao Zhen, Cao 
Rong, Zhu Wei Na, Lin Xiao Yu, Chai Yuan and Zheng Zhe Hai for their supportive help 
on the practical experiences in the subject matter. My special thanks will also give to my 
WMU colleague A Rum Park for her encouragement, which has been a great source of 
inspiration and confidence for the completion of my studies. 
 
Last but not least, I am grateful to my beloved parents in Shanghai who always give me 
their full support. The success and achievement I made during my study in Malmo 
would not have come true without their love and support. 
 
 
 iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:  Evaluation of Shipping Finished Automotive in Multimodal 
Containers – A Marketing Plan for Shipping Company 
 
Degree:                            MSc 
 
Shipping finished automotive by container is a relatively new way compared with the 
traditional RORO modal of car shipping. However this sector has been growing fast in 
recent years. The dissertation is a study of the container modal of automobile shipping, 
aiming at finding out the reason behind such a trend and evaluating its competitiveness 
as a niche method to the dominant RORO modal of car shipping. 
 
The existing research in the field of containerized car shipping is limited. In order to find 
out the supportive factors to the growth of container car shipping, the trend in global 
seaborne car trade, which is the driving force of auto shipping, is investigated. 
Additionally, a comparative analysis of the two shipping modals is carried out from 
various aspects, aiming at identifying the strengths of the container modal.  
 
Most importantly, a cost-benefit analysis is made from the perspectives of both carmaker 
and container line through case studies on the Asia-Europe trade. One the one hand, the 
competitiveness of container modal to RORO modal in terms of total logistic cost is 
examined, by converting both the explicit and intangible costs into monetary units for 
comparison. On the other hand, the benefit from investing in container car shipping 
service is also evaluated in order to examine the feasibility of launching the service from 
the view point of a shipping line. Based on the results, it is anticipated that the container 
modal is more competitive among emerging markets than traditional East-West trade 
lanes. 
 
In the final part of the research, a marketing plan with selected target market and 
marketing strategy is suggested to the China Shipping Group to launch the container car 
shipping service. Furthermore, the concluding chapter looks into the future car shipping 
market and anticipates the role container shipping may play, recommending a time table 
with action plan to the China Shipping Group.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Automotive, Container, RORO, Seaborne Car Trade, Total Logistic Cost 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The global seaborne automotive trade is generally served by a specialized fleet of Pure 
Car Carriers (PCCs). These ships are designed to carry vehicles such as cars, trucks and 
trailers, with in-built ramps enabling vehicles to drive on and off the ships with their 
own powers. The Pure Car Carrier category also includes PCTCs (Pure Car and Truck 
Carriers), which are typically characterized by higher and strengthened decks to enable 
the transportation of high and heavy vehicle cargo. 
 
The PCC was originated from the RORO (Roll-on and Roll-off) vessel, which came into 
existence before the 2
nd
 World War for sending war machines. Until the 1950s it was 
adopted for commercial purposes for short sea car shipping between European countries. 
Due to its efficiency in cargo operations and economy in port expenses, it was quickly 
deployed on deep sea routes by ocean carriers. Soon the Scandinavian shipping 
companies took the lead and built the first PCC to carry commodity cars exclusively for 
car makers (Bohme, 1989). Later Japanese car manufacturers massively introduced them 
to ship their fast growing car exports to the western markets. Today the RORO is the 
dominant way of finished automotive shipping, especially in new car transport, where it  
shares almost nothing with other modes of shipping. 
 
Containers were invented by McLean in the 1950s. Since then the new modal of 
shipping started to change the world. It replaced the traditional way of handling break 
bulk cargo by securing the barrels and cases into standardized metal containers. For the 
last half of the century, container shipping altered the landscape of the global economy 
and the way people live. According to Bohlman (2001), container shipping reduced the 
transit time by 84% and the costs by 35%. Goods are increasingly containerized for 
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international transport. Apart from manufactured goods, more and more commodities 
(such as coffee) as well as refrigerated cargo (fruit, meat, fish) are today largely 
transported in standardized sea containers. Take refrigerated cargo as an example, there 
used to be hot debates on whether it would be massively converted to containerization in 
the 1980s, when a specialized reefer fleet was carrying 70% of its total volume. 
However, today the share of containers is 70% instead (Mohlin, 2014). By 2001, more 
than 90% of world trade in non-bulk goods was transported in ISO containers. Today the 
figure must be even bigger.  
 
However, in finished automobile shipping, container shipping only plays a minor role. 
Despite carrying a huge volume of car parts and CKDs (Completely Knock-Downs), 
normally containers are only used to ship secondhand cars and a negligible share of new 
cars. Today more than 8 million secondhand cars are shipped in containers every year, 
plus 0.15 million classic racing cars, some of which are the most expensive vehicles in 
the world. New cars from OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) shipped by 
containers only total up to 0.7 million per annum, but the volume is growing fast 
(Donaldson, 2014).  
 
The highlights of containerized car shipping can be summarized as fast, flexible and 
secured, sending vehicles from door to door. It is obviously attractive to those expensive 
and low volume outliers. Tesla, for instance, moves all vehicles in containers from its 
US factory to global destinations (Donaldson, 2014). Lotus was an early converter to 
Trans-Rak’s racking system for container shipping (Min & Jianhua, 2007). Premium 
carmaker Bentley Motors, too, makes use of containers to reach particular markets from 
the UK. During 2009 the company shipped around 20% of its output by container 
(Malcolm, 2010). BMW uses containers to specific markets where RORO services are 
not competitive because of the small volumes involved. The company’s usage of 
containers is stable and they are currently shipping less than 1% of their total outbound 
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volumes via containers. Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) is also a small user of containers to 
ship vehicles, dispatching 1.1% of its total production by this method to 19 markets 
(Cross, 2012). Volvo Cars, too, has used containers to ship to small and emerging 
markets. Even some low-end car producers like Chinese BYD, which has exported 
vehicles since 2006, also relies on containerization via CMA CGM to reach markets 
such as Africa, South America and the Middle East. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Structure of the Research 
 
Today shipping finished new vehicles by multimodal containers, though still marginal, is 
more common than before, and tends to be accepted by more carmakers in particular 
trades. Under such circumstances, this research is aiming to find out the reasons behind 
the growing trend of containerized car shipping, evaluate the attractiveness of container 
modal in certain trade and suggest a marketing plan to a shipping company to launch 
container car shipping services. 
 
This paper is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction of current 
finished vehicle shipping market, pointing out the growing trend in container shipping 
out of the traditional RORO shipping. Existing studies and literatures relative to the 
topic are reviewed in Chapter 2, and their contributions and limitations are summarized 
for the sake of supporting and differentiating this research. Chapter 3 is dedicated in 
finding out the driving force behind the increase in container car shipping from its 
determining level - global car trade pattern. It also helps demonstrate the positive trend 
in container modal from the aspect of market demand. In Chapter 4 the strengths of 
container shipping are analyzed in contrast with RORO shipping. In Chapter 5 two case 
studies are launched from the perspectives of both service user and provider, to discuss 
the competitiveness of container modal to a carmaker in terms of total logistic cost in a 
particular trade lane, and to evaluate the investment in container car shipping services 
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for a shipping line. Then a marketing plan is suggested in Chapter 6 to the China 
Shipping Group. Finally the conclusion and recommendation is made in Chapter 7. 
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2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Review of Existing Research 
 
Finished automotive shipping, which belongs to the outbound part of automotive 
logistics, has been studied by many scholars and experts. However the research related 
to container modal is limited. 
 
Some Japanese researchers have studied the feasibility of shipping cars in containers, 
based on the purpose of carrying these containers still on PCCs, naming such kind of 
automotive shipping as LOLO(lift on lift off)-PCC. The study compared the cost of 
transporting a car in RORO and LOLO-PCC methods, from the period it leaves the 
factory to being loaded onto the vessel. It also examined the technical feasibility in terms 
of displacement, stability and resistance of the ship when loaded with car containers. 
One of the important conclusions of this study is in proving the economy of scale of 
stuffing several cars into one container (Tsutomu Momoki, 2011). However, the 
feasibility of loading a PCC with a big volume of containers is fairly low. PCC is 
originally designed for loading vehicles rolling on and off under their own power. In 
order to carry more vehicles, the height of each deck story is tailored to be just enough 
for a worker to drive a vehicle in and out of the vessel. If carrying containers on board 
massively, there probably needs to be a large number of forklifts to load and discharge 
the containers. Obviously its productivity and efficiency in cargo handling is not 
comparable with container ships. As to the cost comparison between RORO and 
LOLO-PCC, it focused on labor cost, covering only the period from leaving the factory 
to loading on board, while the costs such as ocean freight rate, storage, inland carriage 
were not discussed. Therefore, the study was insufficient. Furthermore, the study is 
based on the suggested 45-foot aluminum containers that can carry 4 to 6 cars inside, 
which is a kind of special equipment when compared with the ISO ones. So there will be 
 6 
 
extra costs for shipping lines or car makers to build this type of special container. As the 
utilization may be limited to car shipping only, it is far less economical than using 
general purpose containers. If its benefits cannot offset the costs, it is difficult for either 
party to invest in the new equipment. 
 
Others contributed their knowledge in the part of inland car transport by using containers. 
For example, Tan Miller launched a case study on the best way to transport finished cars 
within North America. The study implemented a mixed integer programming type model 
to determine the best mix of truck, conventional rail and containerized intermodal rail in 
vehicle distribution. At the same time, it evaluated both short-term and long-term 
improvement by shifting the mode from conventional rail to containerized intermodal 
transport. In certain lanes, the whole system cost could be saved by 1% immediately, and 
transit time reduced by 0.5 day. In the long run, the container intermodal transport 
indicated a reduction in total operating costs by up to 6% and total transit time by about 
15% (TAN, 1996). However, the study only focused on the inland part of automobile 
distribution. When it comes to ocean transport, there is no investigation done to discuss 
the possibility in cost and time saving by using intermodal containers. According to Tan 
Miller (1996), car manufacturers have great interest in potential transit time saving in 
order to reduce OTD (Order to Delivery) time, and they are also looking forward to 
some improvement in achieving damage free transport. Therefore, further study on 
ocean shipping is necessary in order to find out if the container mode can meet the 
carmakers’ need to reduce lead time and damage rate in a cost efficient way. 
 
Tao Zeng (2013) established a model and a genetic algorithm to help decision making in 
allocating commodity cars among various modes of transportation. The study has some 
practical significance in reality. Given a certain transportation requirement with route 
and volume, the model can calculate according to the transport cost, transit time and 
capacity constraints under different modes of transport. As a result, it provides an 
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optimal volume allocation among road, railway and waterway transport, aiming at 
minimizing the total logistic cost (ZENG, HU, & HUANG, 2013). The study illustrates a 
clear picture of automotive logistics procedure – how the new cars are moved from the 
plant to the dealer. It also emphasizes the important role shipping plays in the 
automotive outbound logistics. However, this paper is merely based on the conventional 
RORO modal, and there is no specific study the on container side. The result of this 
study can be used as benchmarks to examine the efficiency and competitiveness of 
container shipping. 
 
Matthias Holweg and Joe Miemczyk (2003), based on findings of the 3DayCar research 
program, launched a case study of inbound, outbound auto logistics and sea transport 
operations in the UK market. It provided an in-depth knowledge of current auto logistics 
processes and problems. The paper not only analyzed the motivation of the transition of 
vehicle supply from forecast driven to customer driven, but also discussed the new 
requirements and challenges facing the logistic service providers (Matthias & Joe, 2003). 
The study called for a rethinking of automotive logistic operation towards BTO (Build to 
Order), which is believed to be the way of car production in the future. According to 
some insiders, sooner or later, automotive production will definitely go onto the track of 
BTO, as it is just a matter of time (Junsong, 2009). Thus, with the understanding of the 
role shipping plays in automotive outbound logistics and what the industry expects from 
shipping service providers, we can better evaluate the characteristics of container 
shipping and its potential benefits to the auto industry.  
 
2.2 Methodology Used in This Dissertation 
 
The evaluation of shipping finished vehicles in containers includes both qualitative and 
quantitative parts. The qualitative part is mainly in analyzing the strengths of the 
container modal over the RORO modal, using the comparative analytical method 
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(Collier, 1993), and with the support of industrial data. The quantitative part mainly lies 
in the cost-benefit analysis (Cellini & Kee, 2010) and comparison of the two transport 
modes. In order to better find out the difference in total cost, case studies are launched 
on the Asia-Europe trade lane from the perspectives of both logistic service user and 
provider. The cases are supported by empirical studies and real data from the practical 
business world. 
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3.  Global Seaborne Automotive Trade 
 
3.1 World Economy 
 
The world economy has a significant impact on the automotive industry. It is proved that 
GDP per capita has a positive correlation with car seaborne transport demand (Figure 1). 
The global financial crisis directly led to the collapse in demand in late 2008. After 5 
years of slow recovery, a cautious optimistic outlook towards the world economy in the 
coming years is generally expressed by those international economic institutions. 
According to the World Bank (2014), an actual annual world GDP growth of 3.2% can 
be witnessed in 2014, increased by 0.8% on top of the figure in 2013. IMF (2014) also 
forecasts that the world economy will further strengthen in 2014 and 2015, following the 
trend of late 2013.  
 
Figure 1  GDP per Capita vs. Car Shipping Demand 
 
      Source: RS Platou Economic Research 
 
These forecasts are mainly based on the sign of the strengthening of the US economy 
and the gradual recovery in Europe. Moreover, the stable development of emerging 
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economies, such as China, India and Brazil, also contribute to confidence in the future 
(Table 1). However, they also point out that the prospect of growth still remains fragile, 
due to the uncertainty of keeping up the economy stimulus in major countries, and the 
volatility in world financial and capital markets. 
 
Table 1  Real GDP Growths in Major Economies 
(% change previous period) 
 
  
2012 2013 2014(f) 2015(f) 
Global Economy   3.2 3.0 3.4 3.7 
USA 
 
2.8 1.9 2.8 2.7 
EURO Area 
 
-0.6 -0.5 0.5 1.1 
UK 
 
0.3 1.9 2.5 2.2 
Japan 
 
1.9 1.8 1.3 1.1 
Emerging Markets   4.9 4.8 5.0 5.3 
Asia ex Japan 
 
6.2 6.1 6.0 6.4 
  China 7.7 7.7 7.2 7.4 
  India 5.1 4.7 5.1 6.0 
Latin America 
 
2.9 2.7 2.9 3.0 
  Brazil 1.0 2.3 1.9 1.5 
  Mexico 3.8 1.3 3.3 4.0 
CEEMEA 
 
2.7 2.2 3.2 3.6 
  Russia 3.4 1.5 2.6 2.6 
  S.Africa 2.5 1.8 2.8 3.5 
  Nigeria 6.5 6.8 7.8 7.5 
 
CEEMEA = Central/Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2014) 
 
3.2 Global Automotive Industry  
  
The global automotive industry on the contrary is also a leading driver of global 
economic growth. The industry’s yearly growth rate is expected to exceed 5.5% from 
2010 to 2015, reaching a value of more than $5.1 trillion by 2015 (MarketLine, 2012). It 
is also a leading employer throughout the world. According to the International 
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, the industry provides 9 million jobs in 
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direct vehicle production, representing 5% of the world manufacturing jobs, and another 
50 million jobs in the area indirectly related to the auto industry. To the individual 
country, it is a key sector of the economy in terms of revenue. For example, in the 
United States, the automotive market contributed to approximately 4% of the country’s 
GDP in 2010 (FranchiseHelp, 2014). It is also estimated that the manufacture of vehicles 
contributes more than $430 billion to the governments of 26 countries combined. 
 
3.3 Overview of Global Seaborne Automotive Trade 
 
The world economy growth has been dragging the development of the global automotive 
industry for the last decades, continuously driving the demand for seaborne transport of 
vehicles from the manufacturing centers to the final consuming markets.  
 
3.3.1 Trade volume evolution 
 
Global seaborne car trade volume grew by 179% from 1996 to 2007, at an average pace 
of 9.8% per year. It peaked at 22.4 million vehicles in 2007, and then was hit severely by 
the economic crisis in 2009, dropping by 35%. A gradual recovery has been witnessed 
since 2010. However, until last year, the volume, expecting to rise to 21.5 million, was 
still below the record of 2007 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013). Fortunately, there is 
huge probability that the global car trade in 2014 is projected to increase by 5%, which 
is likely to reach another historical high (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2  Global Automotive Seaborne Trade 
 
 
3.3.2 Global seaborne automotive exports 
 
The Far East to North America and Europe are the largest two routes of the seaborne car 
trade. The biggest exporters on these routes, Japan and South Korea, have been keeping 
their leading position for decades. In 2012 their export together accounted for 40% of 
the global seaborne car trade, although it had already been reduced from a 53% share in 
2003 (Coia, 2013).  
 
Japan is historically a key player in the seaborne car trade. Before the crisis, it exported 
nearly 7.3 million cars in 2008, accounting for 1/3 of the global volume. However, in 
2009 its export volume shrank dramatically by nearly 50%, mainly due to the weak 
demand from major importing countries. Since then Japan’s seaborne car export 
remained at relatively suppressed levels.  
 
Unlike Japan, South Korea’s export increased steadily in the recent 10 years. Despite the 
shock from global recession, its seaborne car export volume already surpassed the level 
before 2008, to 3.3 million cars in 2012. Among its export destinations, US is the biggest 
overseas market, and about 25% of the total seaborne car exports are shipped to North 
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America (Clarkson Research Services, 2013).  
 
The European export performance in the most recent 5 years was quite outstanding 
compared with other major exporters. It recovered from 2.5 million cars in 2009 to 5.2 
million cars in 2013, at an average growth rate of 20% per year. This is mainly attributed 
to the increasing demand from China, as well as the strengthening of the US market. 
Also the US itself is a significant auto exporter representing 9% of the global seaborne 
car trade, but its trade flows are much more diversified and in smaller quantity (Figure 
3). 
 
Figure 3  Global Seaborne Car Exports 
 
 
3.3.3 Global seaborne automotive imports 
 
Likewise, North America and Europe are the two major auto import regions in the world. 
The US alone imported totally around 20% of the world car trade by sea in the last 
decade. While Europe’s import volume (European internal trade excluded) is 
significantly lower than that of the US, and it is recently surpassed by the Far East. So 
far the import volume into both North America and Europe still remains below their 
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levels before the crisis.  
 
Due to the huge share of the US in the global seaborne car trade, the change of demand 
in the US market had a significant impact on the total trade volumes. The US auto 
import peaked at 4.5 million cars in 2006, and stayed more or less stable before the 
collapse to 2.5 million in 2009. After that it picked up gradually, but at a relatively slow 
speed. Japan is the largest supplier of US auto import, accounting for around 50% of the 
whole US import by sea. The US’s slow recovery in demand is also one of the main 
factors that results in the suppressed exports from Japan.  
 
The European seaborne car import was surpassed by that to the Far East for the first time 
in 2012. In that year, the Far East imported 2.5 million cars while the volume to Europe 
dropped by 9% to 2.1 million. According to Clarkson’s research, the share of Japanese 
and Korean cars in European imports was decreasing in these years, from 48% in 2007 
to 38% in 2012, while countries in the Far East, as well as other emerging regions, are 
importing more than ever before (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4  Global Seaborne Car Imports 
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3.4 Trend in Global Seaborne Automotive Trade 
 
Generally there is a positive trend in the growth of the global seaborne automotive trade. 
However, the trade flow and structure has begun to change in recent years.  
 
3.4.1 Increasing share of emerging countries 
 
As the shares of most traditional trading countries are shrinking, the roles played by 
other countries, especially by emerging economies, are becoming increasingly important. 
Countries like China, India, Thailand and Turkey have experienced strong growth in car 
export in the last decade (Figure 5). For example, China’s export volume has grown by 
1044% to 1.1 million since 2003, now representing 5% of global seaborne car exports. 
During the same period, exports from India and Thailand have also increased 
dramatically by 772% and 576% respectively.  
 
Figure 5  Seaborne Car Exports from Emerging Countries 
 
 
On the import side, shares of countries other than North America and Europe rose from 
43% in 2003 to 67% in 2013, in which China’s share increased from 1.2% to 4.9%, and 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Turkey
Thailand
India
China
Brazil
South Africa
Source: Clarkson Research Services. 
(,000 vehicles) 
 16 
 
Brazil and Argentina together achieved 5.5% from 2.7% (Figure 6). Despite the 
recession starting from 2008, shipments to developing countries in Asia have increased 
by 70%, and to Brazil and Argentina combined have grown by 53% (Crowe, 2013).  
 
Figure 6  Seaborne Car Import to Emerging Countries 
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Besides the booming demand in developing countries, their increase in the share of 
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also planned to expand its capacity in the US and Canada. Further, both Honda and 
Mazda are scheduled to open new factories in Q1 2014 (Coia, 2013). The movement of 
assembly factories from South Korea to Eastern Europe and North America has been 
witnessed as well. More European productions are also expected to shift from the Euro 
zone or South Africa to their final overseas markets (Ludwig, Williams, & Apostolides, 
2013).  
 
3.4.3 Influence in automotive shipping 
 
According to the trend of global seaborne vehicle trade, traditional long leg trade from 
Japan, South Korea to North America and Europe is expected to be slightly reduced. 
However, it is projected that a significant increase in the number of new routes into and 
out of emerging economies will occur, as well as a boom in volume generated by 
intra-regional trades.  
 
In such circumstances, more diversified and frequent shipping services will be called for 
in order to satisfy the needs of the seaborne car trade between more fragmented markets. 
Therefore, these changes may distract the volume of current deep sea shipping. 
Meanwhile, short sea and regional shipping could gain benefits and new deep sea routes 
may even be created.  
 
In the near future, higher frequency of shipment, smaller volume each time and more 
diversified port pairs will probably be the new characteristics of automotive shipping.  
 
3.5 Opportunity Identification for Container Shipping  
 
Traditionally finished automotive is shipped by Pure Car Carriers. As the trend of the 
global automotive trade alters, this conventional way of shipping may face some 
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challenges, but it could be an opportunity for container shipping.  
 
Those emerging car markets will lessen the traffic of traditional East/West deep sea 
routes, which the huge PCC was originally invented for. They are in the regions where 
PCC services may not have been well covered. While for container shipping lines, 
especially those leading companies in the world, they have already established much 
more comprehensive service networks, covering diversified markets worldwide. The 
larger number of service and higher sailing frequency of container shipping can be both 
attractive and available to meet the demand of these emerging markets.  
 
Besides the merits that match the trend of automotive shipping, the container mode now 
also appears to be a good alternative solution for car shipping in terms of cost efficiency. 
With the rapid development of containerization in past decades, the cost to transport a 
container now is much lower than before. The economies of scale of mega container 
ships, ever increasing numbers of large and specialized terminals and widely adopted 
handling facilities, all enable the decrease in transport costs of container shipping more 
than ever before. 
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4.  Comparative Analysis on RORO and Container Shipping 
 
4.1 Competition Environment 
 
Unlike the perfect competition in tramp shipping, the competition in both the car carrier 
and container shipping market are incomplete. The difference is that the car carrier 
shipping market supply is even more consolidated and monopolized by fewer but bigger 
players than in container shipping. 
 
Access to the market of seaborne car transport is subject to economic and political 
obstacles. As a result, only relatively few companies are engaged in this operation. 
Leading operators of specialized auto carriers can be divided into three groups. The first 
group is Scandinavian carriers, including Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics and Höegh 
Autoliners. The second is the Japanese group, including Mitsui-O.S.K. Lines, Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha, and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha. The third is South Korean Hyundai Glovis 
and Eukor (Clarkson Research Services, 2013). As of January 2014, the top five 
operators combined (including sister companies and subsidiaries) deployed a fleet of 501 
vessels, with a total capacity of 2,693,000 CEU, accounting for 73% of the global fleet 
(Table 2). Usually the shipping companies are closely tied up with car producers, 
because the vast majority of the seaborne car traffic is shipped against annual agreement, 
and the high degree of specialization of the ships requires long term contracts to 
guarantee utilization. Moreover, the ships are often financed by major carmakers, by 
which method the carmakers can have better long-term control of their shipment. The 
most distinct example of such close ties is Japan, in which way its car carrier fleet grew 
rapidly in recent decades. To the shipping companies, space utilization is locked at high 
levels and they can sell the rest allocation for better profit. To the carmakers, their 
interests are protected and they can stay more competitive than their rivals in the 
shipping section by guaranteed service at low costs.  
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Table 2  Market Share of Top 5 Car Carrier Operators 
 
No Carrier 
Operated Fleet Order Book 
Number 
of Ship 
Capacity 
(1,000 CEU) 
Number 
of Ship 
Capacity 
(1,000 CEU) 
1 WWL 126 820 10 76 
2 MOL 124 625 1 6 
3 NYK 121 591 4 28 
4 K Line 85 391 10 74 
5 Hoegh Auto 45 264 10 77 
Total Top 5 501 2691 35 261 
World Fleet 776 3679 67 469 
Share Top 5 65% 73% 52% 56% 
 
Note: Data of Jan 2014 
Source: Dynamar 
 
Since the new entrants are kept out of the market by close partnerships and long term 
contracts, the dominant players enjoy a monopolized market. One piece of evidence was 
that the freight rate of car carrier shipping market did not plunge as other shipping 
sectors in recent years. Take the Korea-Europe route as an example; despite the slump in 
car sales in 2009, the ocean freight rate has been keeping stable around USD60/cubic 
meter since the beginning of 2007 (Figure 7) (Dixon, 2013). This means for a middle 
sized car like the Sonata the freight rate is about USD750/car. Interestingly, in 2000 the 
car carrier freight rate of the similar route from Japan to the UK was around USD700 as 
well (Matthias & Joe, 2003). The stable rate was not a coincidence, but likely to be the 
result of oligopoly. That is why a number of big car carrier operators were involved in an 
antitrust probe in late 2012. They were inspected by authorities such as Japan Fair Trade 
Commission, European Commission and Federal Maritime Commission. Some of the 
carriers confirmed that they have received preliminary rulings that suggested they were 
involved in unfair trade practices.  
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Figure 7  Car Carrier Freight Rate 
Korea - Europe (USD per cbm) 
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(Table 3), and nearly all the top 20 shipping lines can provide global services. Secondly, 
the container shipping market is highly volatile and the average freight rate was 
struggling around breakeven level even after the crisis. One of the reasons was the weak 
demand and over supply that pushed the carriers to fight for every single box to fill their 
empty slots. Other factors such as the termination of FEFC (Far East Freight Conference) 
also caused the volatility of the freight market in Far East-Europe trade (Figure 8). 
According to Dynamar’s study, in the past five years, shipping lines lost an average 16 
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Table 3  Market Share of Top 10 Container Shipping Lines 
 
No Carrier 
Operated Fleet Order Book 
Number 
of Ship 
Capacity 
(1,000 TEU) 
Number 
of Ship 
Capacity 
(1,000 TEU) 
1 Maersk 574 2717 13 219 
2 MSC 498 2482 37 429 
3 CMA CGM 430 1583 39 371 
4 Evergreen 191 887 20 246 
5 COSCON 96 785 7 74 
6 Hapag-Lloyd 65 765 0 0 
7 CSCL 75 649 8 125 
8 Hanjin 35 603 8 70 
9 APL 49 568 1 9 
10 MOL 33 567 14 115 
Total Top 10 2046 11606 147 1658 
World Fleet 4976 18220 489 3601 
Share Top 10 41% 64% 30% 46% 
 
Note: Data of Jul 2014 
Source: Alphaliner 
 
Figure 8  Volatility of Container Freight Market 
China-Europe Container Freight Index 
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will expand their cooperation to the US trade. Other top single players are also expected 
to team up in certain form to cope with the uncertainty in the future market. 
 
Therefore, in the competitive container shipping market, especially when it is over 
supplied, the shipping lines are trying by all means to lower the running costs and 
increase the service quality in order to stay competitive. Car makers may take the 
advantage to start or increase the share of container shipping for their outbound 
distribution, as they can enjoy better service at cheaper prices.  
 
4.2 Fleet Development 
 
4.2.1 Current fleet 
 
Both PCC and the container fleet experienced fast expansion together with the boom in 
trade volume in recent decades, but the container fleet is growing at an even faster pace. 
In addition, due to the difference in target market and service function, the scale of the 
container fleet is incomparable with the PCC fleet in terms of both capacity (Figure 9) 
and number of ships (Figure 10). 
Figure 9  Fleet Capacity Comparison 
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Figure 10  Vessel Number Comparison 
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soft in the short-term before 2016 (Table 4). However, the global seaborne car trade is 
projected to increase by 5% in 2014 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013). Therefore, 
some imbalance in supply and demand in the PCC shipping market can be experienced 
in the coming years.  
 
Table 4  Fleet Capacity Forecast 
 
 
PCC Fleet Container Fleet 
 
(,000 CEU) Growth (,000 TEU) Growth 
2014 3671 1.6% 18103 5.7% 
2015 3753 2.2% 19310 6.7% 
2016 3917 4.4% 20222 4.7% 
     
Source: Drewry Maritime Research 
 
Unlike the PCC fleet, the container fleet capacity will keep increasing steadily in the 
foreseeable future. Although the growth rate cooled down after the crisis to a historically 
low level, new order books now, especially for ultra large vessels, have been keeping 
placed for the sake of a potential recovery of the market. Hence, the annual growth rate 
still remains at around 6%. However, demand has not picked up as expected. According 
to Drewry (2014), the world container traffic is estimated to grow by 4.2% and 5.0% in 
2014 and 2015 respectively. Thus, the over-supply situation in the container shipping 
market is not likely to be improved completely in the near future.  
 
4.3 Economy of Scale 
 
4.3.1 Ship size upgrade 
 
There is the same trend in both the PCC and container fleet where the capacity 
development is highly focused on ships of large sizes to achieve the economies of scale. 
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PCCs with capacity over 6000CEU account for nearly 60% of the current fleet, and 91% 
of the capacity in the order book (Figure 11). Almost all the new deliveries in the 
coming years are large vessels to be deployed on deep sea routes. Despite the motivation 
to achieve further economies of scale, another reason can be the widening of the Panama 
Canal that will allow large-sized PCCs up to 8500CEU to pass in 2016. 
 
Figure 11  PCC Order Book by Size 
                      (% of CEU Capacity) 
 
 
As to the container fleet, the concentration on mega ships is not as significant as the 
PCC fleet, but it is still remarkable. According to Drewry, in January 2014, the total 
capacity of ships over 12,000TEU accounted for 12% of the global container fleet, while 
they only stood for 3% of the total ship number. In the last five years, the ultra large 
vessel sector witnessed the highest growth by 42.5% in capacity, while the sector of 
vessels below 4000TEU has continued to shrink. Moreover, 54% of the capacity on the 
order book attributes to ships over 10000TEU, in which ships over 14000TEU account 
for 32% (Figure 12).   
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Figure 12  Container Ship Order Book by Size 
                                  (% of TEU Capacity) 
 
 
4.3.2 Ship unit running cost  
Although mega vessels can only be deployed on limited main routes, they are replacing 
the smaller vessels and pushing them on to other routes. Therefore, the average vessel 
size on all routes will increase as a result of this cascading effect, and the average unit 
cost is expected to be further reduced. Nowadays, in terms of car equivalent unit, the 
running cost, including capital cost, operating cost and voyage cost (Malcom Willingale 
V.Group, 2014) of a mega container ship tends to be lower than that of a large PCTC. 
 
Firstly, the large container ship is more competitive in unit capital cost. Assuming 60% 
of the car traffic fits for the ‘two cars into one TEU’ style, each TEU can load averagely 
1.4 cars (Chen, 2014). In such circumstances the unit new building price of the current 
largest 18000TEU container ship is 30% lower than that of the biggest 8500CEU car 
carrier (Table 5). Taking into account the repayment of loan principal, interest and 
depreciation, the capital cost of one car carrying unit is still expected to be lower in the 
container mode.  
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Table 5  Unit New Building Price Comparison 
 
Vessel Type Capacity 
New Building 
Price/Ship   
(Million USD) 
New Building 
Price/Unit 
(Thousand USD) 
New Building 
Price/Car unit  
(Thousand USD) 
PCTC 6500 CEU 60 9.23 9.23 
PCTC 8500 CEU 70 8.24 8.24 
Container 13000 TEU 110 8.64 6.04 
Container 18000 TEU 140 7.78 5.56 
  
Note: 1. Assumption: 60% of the vehicle can fit into 1TEU with 2 cars 
 
2. New building price of Sep 2013 
Source:  Clarkson Research Services 
 
Secondly, a container ship has no disadvantage in unit operating cost and voyage cost 
(bunker cost usually accounts for 60% of the voyage cost). Taking the bunker price as 
USD630/ton, the cost of a car carrying unit per day of different vessel size can be 
estimated as below (Table 6). For a 4000CEU PCTC or an 8000TEU container ship, the 
difference in cost is very slim. For an 8500CEU PCTC, the cost is estimated to be 
similar to a 14000TEU container ship. Therefore container ships of capacity over 
14000TEU benefit from the economy of scale more than even the largest PCTC in the 
world. 
 
Table 6  Vessel Unit Operating and Voyage Cost Comparison 
 
Vessel 
Type 
Capacity 
Operating 
Cost 
(USD/day) 
Bunker 
Consumption 
(ton/day) 
Bunker Price 
(USD/ton) 
Cost 
(USD/Unit/day) 
Cost 
(USD/CarUnit/day) 
PCTC 2000CEU 5000 30 630 5.98 5.98 
PCTC 4000CEU 6000 40 630 3.90 3.90 
PCTC 6500 CEU 8000 48 630 2.94 2.94 
PCTC 8500 CEU 9500 54 630 2.56 2.56 
Container 4500TEU 10000 100 630 7.30 5.21 
Container 8000TEU 13000 120 630 5.54 3.96 
Container 13000 TEU 14500 133 630 3.78 2.70 
Container 18000 TEU 18000 121 630 2.62 1.87 
  
Note: 1. Ship operating costs include manning, insurance, stores/lubes, R&M, and admin 
 
2. Capital cost, diesel cost, port cost, canal passage excluded 
 
3. Assumption: 60% of the vehicle can fit into 1TEU with 2 cars 
Source:  Based on Drewry Maritime Research / Clarkson Research Services / Lloyds list 
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In the meantime, the bunker price turns out to be crucial to the advantage in the unit 
running cost of container ships. As the PCC consumes much less fuel than a container 
counter party, if the bunker price decreases, the advantage of a container ship will 
diminish quickly. However, the time of high fuel cost is still expected to continue in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover, on routes where there is more limitation on the vessel size, 
the advantage of a mega container ship is quite slim (Drewry, 2013-35). For example, in 
transpacific and transatlantic trade, where a 9000TEU ship is the maximum to be 
accepted by some of the US ports while a 8500CEU PCTC can be served there without 
much difficulty, a conventional car carrier is still efficient in terms of the unit running 
cost. 
 
4.4 Service Coverage and Frequency  
 
Generally car carriers are also operated in the manner of liner shipping, with fixed ports 
of call, transit time and sailing frequency. However, the intensiveness of sailing 
frequency, the length of transit time and the range of service coverage of RORO 
shipping is far less comprehensive than container shipping. 
 
For example, it is common in the market that car carrier lines operate fortnightly 
services even in major deep-sea routes. Weekly sailing is considered to be high 
frequency. The frequency of selected services of the top 6 car carrier companies is 
relatively low (Table 7), while they represent nearly all deep sea capacity supply and 
more than 75% of the total market share. Transpacific has the highest number of sailings 
where every week there are around 5 to 6 sailings from the Far East to North America. 
The Far East-Europe and Transatlantic is less frequently served, with about 4 sailings 
per week respectively in the market. However in the container shipping market, the 
number of sailings per week on these major deep sea routes is up to 7 times of that of the 
car carrier market (Table 8).  
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Container shipping also proves to be faster than car carrier service. Generally the longer 
the sailing distance, the more time saving can be achieved by container shipping. For 
instance, transit time from the last POL (Port of Loading) in Far East to the first POD 
(Port of Discharging) in Europe is about 21 days via Maersk AE10 service (Table 8), 
while it takes 26 days via NYK car carrier service (Table 7). The saving is also evident 
in transpacific trade, but in transatlantic trade is difference is only 1 day. 
 
Table 7  Frequency & Transit Time of Major East-West Car Carrier Services 
 
  Far East/Europe Transpacific Transatlantic 
Carrier 
No.of 
Service / 
Month 
Transit 
Time 
(Days) 
No.of 
Service / 
Month 
Transit 
Time 
(Days) 
No.of 
Service / 
Month 
Transit 
Time 
(Days) 
WWL(incl.Eukor) 8~10 
 
12~12 
 
4 
 
MOL 2 
   
4 
 
NYK 2~3 26 
  
4~6 10 
K Line 
  
4 28 4 10 
Höegh 3 36 2 25 2 11 
Hyundai Glovis 2 
 
5~8 
   
 
Note: Slot chartering services could be included in the number of services 
Source: Carriers' official websites 
 
Table 8  Frequency & Transit Time of Major East-West Container Services 
 
  
Number of 
Weekly Services 
Average Vessel 
Size (TEU) 
Transit Time 
(Days) 
Far East/Europe 
Far East/North Europe 22 11,229 21 (AE10) 
Far East/Mediterranean 15 8,156 
 
Total 37 10,024 
 
Transpacific 
Far East/USWC 42 6,726 11 (TP5) 
Far East/USEC - Panama 13 4,554 
 
Far East/USEC - Suez 6 7,067 22 (TP3) 
Total 61 6,218 
 
Transatlantic 
Europe/North Atlantic 7 4,547 10 (TA2) 
Europe/US Gulf & Mex 6 4,068 
 
Europe/Montreal(Canada) 3 3,570 
 
Total 16 4,254 
 
 
Note: Transit time is based on Maersk Services 
Source: Drewry Maritime Research / Maersk 
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Moreover, container shipping is more extensive in service coverage than RORO 
shipping, providing a wider range of destination possibilities for the seaborne car trade. 
The high Liner Shipping Connectivity Index ( the index captures how well countries are 
connected to global shipping networks) of traditional car trade ports in developed 
countries enables the shift of auto shipping to the container mode (The World Bank, 
2014). In emerging countries container service accessibility is also increasing fast. It 
provides the opportunity for container lines to share the pie of the fast growing car trade 
into and out of these new markets (Table 9). By contrast, car carrier services do not 
cover those secondary ports as well as container services. Since the total number of 
PCCs in the world is only 15% of that of the container fleet, it is impossible to deploy as 
many car carrier loops as container ones. Even if there is a RORO service connection in 
some smaller ports, the schedule tends to be more flexible than the container service, 
because the car carrier company may sometimes skip calling due to the limited cargo 
volume. 
 
Table 9  Liner Shipping Connectivity of Major Car Trade Countries 
 
 
Index (Maximum 2004=100) 
 
Traditional Origins and Destinations 2004 2009 2014 
Korea, Republic of 69 87 108 
United States 83 82 95 
Netherlands 79 89 94 
Germany 77 84 94 
United Kingdom 82 85 88 
Belgium 73 83 81 
Japan 69 66 62 
Emerging Origins and Destinations 
China 100 132 165 
Malaysia 63 81 104 
Turkey 26 32 52 
India 34 41 46 
Thailand 31 37 45 
Brazil 26 31 42 
Mexico 25 32 40 
South Africa 23 32 38 
Argentina 20 26 38 
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Russian Federation 12 21 38 
 
Source: UNCTAD STAT 
 
4.5 Cargo Handling Technology 
 
The cargo handling technology in the two logistic systems is totally different. In the 
RORO system, vehicles depend on their own power to drive on and off any kind of 
transport carriers, while in the container mode cars are loaded and sealed into sea 
containers and moved as any other ordinary multimodal ones. 
 
Usually when the new cars come off from the production line, they are loaded on to the 
specialized truck trailer to a VDC/VSC (Vehicle Distribution/Storage Center). These are 
usually near the plants, because the factory often has limited space to store a huge 
volume of new cars. These trailers’ capacity varies from 6 to 18 cars. The gang of the 
loading and unloading operation is composed of 2 or 3 workers, including 1 new car 
driver, 1 lasher and 1 truck driver. The average time to load a trailer of 11 cars is 113 
minutes (Matthias Holweg; Joe Miemczyk; Geoff Williams , 2001), about 10 minutes for 
each car, and the unloading is usually faster. When it comes to loading a PCTC, usually 
a gang of 20 to 30 stevedores, according to the capacity of the ship, is sent by shuttle van 
to the yard, from where they drive the new cars one by one onto the ship via its 
self-equipped ramp. After parking the cars at the assigned positions, they are sent back 
by the van to the yard to pick up another lot. At the same time the other gang of lashers 
will fasten the cars tight down on the ground in the vessel. After the new cars are 
discharged at the destination port, they are will be either stored in the terminal parking 
lot or transferred by truck or train to another distribution center or directly to the dealers. 
 
As to using containers to ship automobiles, the number of cars to be accommodated into 
a box is the basic factor deciding if the solution is economically feasible or not. In order 
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to load more vehicles in one container, in the past a common way is to build up wooden 
racks inside the container to separate the inner space and support several cars at the same 
time. The problem is the fairly low reliability of the wood and high cost of building such 
disposable racks. Now there is some revolutionary equipment in the industry, such as the 
collapsible or removable car racks systems that can accommodate up to 6 cars in one 40 
foot high cube container. 
 
According to the practice of CSCL (China Shipping Container Line), which has been 
using a special collapsible car rack system to ship new cars for some car makers in the 
China domestic trade (Figure 13), the loading process requires 4 to 5 workers, including 
1 container tractor driver,1 new car driver, 1 forklift driver and 1 or 2 lashers. The test in 
the initial stage shows that it took about 40 minutes to load four cars into a 40-foot high 
cube box, and 35 minutes for unloading, which was not much slower than loading the 
truck trailer in the RORO manner. Another type of removable car rack designed by 
Trans-Rak takes only 35 minutes to load 5 small cars in one 40 footer and 20 minutes to 
unload (Min & Jianhua, 2007), and it needs no machinery to help with the cargo 
handling. This type of car rack can be installed manually into a container of any size 
(Figure 14). Comparatively it saves one forklift driver, spares more space for vehicles of 
bigger dimension and increases the efficiency in operation. By raising and securing the 
vehicles up to the roof space, the system maximizes the number of cars to be loaded into 
one container. The distance between poles and the angle of rising can be flexibly 
adjusted according to specific dimension of the vehicles. The racks can also be packed 
up into small pods for repositioning, and a 40-foot container can load up to 65 pods of 
these racks (TRANS-RAK International).  
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Figure 13  Revolutionary Car Rack System 1 
 
 
Source: China Shipping Container Line 
 
Figure 14  Revolutionary Car Rack System 2 
 
Source: Trans-Rak International 
 
 
4.6 Safety and Security 
 
Safety and security is another important aspect concerned in finished automotive 
logistics. The industry aims at delivering the right car, damage-free to the right place, at 
the right time. However, in the conventional RORO system, new cars are not protected 
as other packed products during transportation. The open carriage can result in damage 
or even theft due to weak operation awareness and poor risk management standards. 
 
Damage to the new vehicles happens for many reasons, but one of the main areas that 
damage occurs is when the vehicle is being handled, driven on and off the various modes 
of transport, or into and out of storage compounds (Figure 15). For example, a new 
Volvo car is driven by at least 17 persons from it getting off the production line in 
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Gothenburg until delivery to an overseas dealer (Mao S. , 2003). The risk of damage is 
high due to the high frequency of handling. When the buyer eventually receives the 
vehicle, the new car is no longer new. Other causes include adverse weather, e.g., hail; 
airborne contamination from industrial fallout; salt water from the sea; small stones 
carried by strong winds; excrements and scratches from birds (Larsson, 2014).  
 
Figure 15  Causes of Damage during Transportation 
 
The damage and theft rate varies among territories. Sevatas (2013), the leader in the 
provision of risk management, claims and damage reduction solutions in Europe, points 
out that although logistics service providers have been training their staff to raise the 
awareness of damage prevention, the average level of damage in Europe is still nearly 
3%. It costs up to 200 million euros every year, including insurance and administration 
to reduce such incidents (Sevatas, 2013). In the UK, the damage rate is around 2.5% per 
year, and the average repair cost is about GBP 180 per car damaged (Matthias & Joe, 
2003). Moreover, in a UK dealer with an annual sales volume of 400 cars, the insurance 
cost for its stock is GBP 125 per new car sale (Holweg, Matthias; Jones, Professor 
Daniel T., 2001). In the US the ratio is claimed to be lower. While in the emerging 
countries, safety and security is a big issue. For example, Mexico railways spend about 
$2.5 million per month on security (Ludwig, Williams, & Apostolides, 2013); Theft rate 
remains at a high level on the northbound from South Africa; In India damage has been a 
23% 
66% 
1% 
1% 
6% 
3% 
Physical damage during transport
Physical damage during
loading/unloading
Weather related damage
Paint damage due to bird
excrements
Undetected before delivery
Others
Source: 3DayCar Logistics Study 
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problem difficult to reduce (Malcolm, 2010). 
 
During the period of ocean shipping, the damage levels vary between 0.2% and 3.5%, 
mainly due to vehicle movement on rough seas, and during loading and unloading 
(Matthias Holweg; Joe Miemczyk; Geoff Williams , 2001). Sometimes not all the 
damage is transport related, since they might also refer to damage not detected before 
loading on board the ship. Actually the financial cost of the damage itself is not a big 
deal, but the time wasted in damage inspection between transport modal conversion (a 
standard PDI for one car takes about 4.6 minutes) (Rahman, T.C.Melewar, & Sharif, 
2014), and the extra time it takes for maintenance and repair will lead to failure in 
on-time delivery, harming the reputation of the car producer.  
 
If using containers to ship new cars, the problem of safety and security can be solved to 
a great extent. The container not only provides the shelter for new cars, but also 
eliminates the movement of them throughout the period of transport. It enables the 
logistic service providers to achieve quality handling and damage-free delivery. 
According to the statistics from CSCL, the damage rate of its containerized car shipping 
service in the China domestic market is only 0.01%. Richard Cox, CEO of KTI (Kar 
Tainer International), a company supplying cassette-based systems, also says that one of 
their car manufacturer customers reported a damage rate reduction from 5% in the 
RORO system to 0.02% in their KTI system over a three-year period (Cross, 2012). 
Therefore, containerization provides a safe and secure way of car shipping that can 
deliver the new cars in their factory conditions to the customer. 
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5. Cost and Benefit Analysis by Case Study 
 
5.1 BTS and BTO 
 
BTS (Build to Stock) and BTO (Build to Order) are the two common production 
approaches in the automotive industry. However they leads to different structures and 
levels of cost in the completed automotive logistics.  
 
BTS originated from mass production after the industrial revolution. Generally it is still 
the dominant way of auto production in the world. Products are built according to the 
sales forecast and historical demand. In such a manner, carmakers can achieve 
economies of scale through mass production. As long as there is stock in the compounds, 
new cars can be delivered to the receivers as fast as transport be can achieved. However, 
this is accomplished at the expense of a high inventory level and huge amount of capital 
tied up. Take the US as an example, at the end of January 2014, the US light vehicle 
inventory totaled 3.61 million units, 90 days’ supply, which amounted to about 50 billion 
USD being tied up (Stoddard, 2014). On average, the inventory level of light vehicles in 
the US has been maintained at 65 days in last two years (Figure 16). Besides the high 
inventory holding cost, usually the stock will also end up being sold at massive 
discounts.  
Figure 16  U.S. Light Vehicle Days' Supply 
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On the contrary, BTO is the approach to produce according to customers’ specific 
requirements. In other words, there is no action until an order comes in and triggers the 
production process for one specific product assigned to the customer. Actually it is the 
oldest way of order fulfillment, but for a long time it has been employed mainly for high 
end, low volume products. For example, it is unlikely to find a Lamborghini built 
according to a sales forecast.  
 
The fact is that the industry is moving more towards the BTO approach even for 
common models. A dozen years ago, the BTO level in major markets was relatively low 
(Table 10), but today some major carmakers’ BTO volume has climbed up to 60% 
(Wheatley, 2013). However, the strategy adopted varies among different carmakers. 
Take Japanese producers for example. Toyota and Nissan are the piorneers in BTO 
strategy, already starting the transition decades ago, while Honda and Subaru produce all 
their vehicles to forecast. The transformation to BTO can improve efficiency and 
performance especially in areas where build to forecast has its major deficiencies, such 
as high inventory carrying cost and the slow response to volatile demand from the 
market.  
 
Table 10  Sales Sourcing in Major Markets 2000 
  
Sales source Europe UK Germany US 
Japan 
(Toyota) 
Cars built to customer order (BTO) (%) 48 32 62 6 60 
Sales from central stock (distribution centers) 
or transfer between dealers (BTS) (%) 
14 51 8 5 6 
Sales from dealer stock (BTS) (%) 38 17 30 89 34 
Source: (Holweg, 2008) 
 
A different production and sales approach will lead to a different outbound logistic 
process (Figure 17 and Figure18). In the conventional BTS system, after new cars leave 
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the plant, they tend to be stored in the compounds up to months waiting for the buyer. 
Up to 20% of vehicles have to be transferred between distribution centers (Matthias 
Holweg; Joe Miemczyk; Geoff Williams , 2001), and around 15% of the stock in VDC 
will be further shipped to regional compounds (Matthias & Joe, 2003). In the BTO 
system, the new cars tend to reach the receivers as soon as possible after leaving the 
plant. Nowadays, most carmakers apply a hybrid production mode, consisting of both 
BTS for quick delivery of basic models and BTO for customizing for more sophisticated 
demand. 
 
Figure 17  Finished Automotive Logistics Flow Chart under BTS 
(when there is sea leg) 
 
Source: based on information from APL logistics and CSCL 
 
 
Figure 18  Finished Automotive Logistics Flow Chart under BTO 
(when there is sea leg) 
 
Source: APL logistics 
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5.2 Cost Analysis from Car Maker’s Perspective 
 
5.2.1 Objectives 
In this section, a case study is made for Hyundai Motor on the Korea-Belgium trade lane, 
focusing on the cost comparison of RORO and container modal under both BTS and 
BTO production approaches. The cost breakdowns are examined and the factors 
affecting the total logistic cost, such as car value and export volume, are discussed.  
 
Hyundai Motor Group is the 5
th
 largest car manufacturers in the world. Despite the 
shrinking of the total world sales during the recession, it has been growing steadily in 
terms of global new car sales market share, rising from 6% in 2007 to 9% projected in 
2014 (Seung-heon, 2014).  
 
Hyundai Motors’ main production facility is located in Ulsan Korea, 50km north of 
Pusan. It is the largest single automobile plant in the world with a daily production 
capacity of 6000 vehicles for both domestic and overseas markets. Belgium is the 
gateway of the continent for new car trade. The traffic was traditionally via Antwerp and 
now more and more through Zeebrugge, together making Belgium a distribution hub of 
European market. Another reason to choose this route is that both Korea and Belgium 
enjoy a high level of liner shipping connectivity, making the opting from RORO to 
container logistics more realistically feasible. Although today the Ulsan plant only 
contributes partly to Hyundai’s total exports to Europe, as a typical Asia–Europe route, it 
is worth studying and the result can be instructive to other routes as well. 
 
5.2.2 Evaluation premises 
 
 Total Logistics Cost = Order Cost + Inventory Carrying Cost (Ma, 2014) 
Order Cost mainly refers to Transportation Cost. 
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Inventory Carrying Cost includes Capital Cost, Warehousing Cost (Storage), 
Inventory Service Cost (Insurance) and Inventory Risk Cost (Security). 
This case study will convert the above costs into monetary units and sum up under 
both RORO and Container modal for comparison (Table 11).  
 PCTC transit time: 42 days, based on Eukor schedule. There is only one sailing 
from Ulsan to Belgium per week in the market. 
Container ship transit time: 33 days, based on Hanjin schedule. There is service 
once every two days from Pusan to Belgium in the market. 
 Car trailer average speed: 30km/h; Container truck average speed: 40km/h 
 Distance between Ulsan plant and Ulsan car terminal: 10km  
Distance between Ulsan plant and Pusan container terminal: 50km  
Distance between port of Antwerp/Zeebrugge and final dealer compound: 200km 
 Average storage time in Belgium under BTS: 3 weeks 
 Annual export volume: 100,000 cars 
 In the BTS approach, the container modal only applies during the ocean shipping 
period. Since new cars tend to be stocked for months waiting for firm orders, it is 
not feasible to store with the containers and car racks tied up. They need to be 
transferred to the RORO modal. Otherwise the cost tends to be very high. 
 In the BTO approach, the container modal provides a door-to-door service from the 
plant to the dealer’s compound. 
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Table 11  Cost Items in Automotive Outbound Logistics 
 
Cost Items 
Rate (in USD) 
Korea Belgium 
Order Cost 
Transportation 
Cost 
Trucking rate /car/km (12 cars trailer) 0.8 1 
Trucking rate /car/km (40'HC with 4 cars) 1.5 1.8 
Trailer loading or unloading rate per car 3 4 
Container loading or unloading rate per car 10 12 
Car terminal handling charge per car 10 14 
Container terminal handling charge per 40'HC 140 215 
PCTC Ocean Freight Rate per Car 700 
Container Ocean Freight Rate per 40'HC 2000 
Inventory 
Carrying 
Cost 
Warehousing 
Cost 
Compound storage cost per car 1 1 
Car terminal storage rate after 7 days free / car 1.5 1.5 
Container terminal storage rate after 7 days free / 40’HC 10 10 
Capital Cost Capital Cost 0.1 
Inventory Risk 
Cost 
RORO Security Cost /car/day 0.8 
Container Security Cost /40'HC/day 2 
Inventory 
Service Cost 
RORO Insurance Cost /car/day 1.8 
Container Insurance Cost /40'HC/day 4 
Source: based on statistics from Anji, CSCL, Hyundai,3DayCar Study, (Zhang, 2005), (Jovanovic, 2014), (Chen, 2014) 
 
5.2.3 Evaluation results 
 
 The total transportation cost in RORO system is lower than container system.  
Though the ocean freight rates of both modes are supposed to be the same, the 
container THC (Terminal Handling Charge) is higher than RORO HTC. Also inland 
transport by means of container is more costly than the RORO modal. The result 
shows that the trucking cost, including loading and unloading cost, RORO is USD 
103 cheaper than container under BTS, and USD 224 cheaper under BTO. The main 
reason is that the car trailer, usually carrying 12 cars, achieves a better scale 
economy than a container truck. Especially in BTO, it can still benefit from the 
current RORO inland transport system, while to container modal, the longer 
distance a container truck travels, the more expensive it is than a car trailer. 
 
 Capital cost in the container system is lower.  
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Due to the shorter transit time and higher sailing frequency of container line 
services, the total lead time is shorter when there is a container leg involved; so it 
helps lower the capital cost. 
 
 Storage cost is the same 
As it is always converted to the form of RORO when it comes to storage in the 
compounds, and with the same assumed storage time, the cost is the same under 
both transport styles. 
 
 Inventory risk cost and inventory service cost are lower in the container mode.  
The cost mainly includes security and insurance expenses. The container provides 
the shelter for new cars loaded inside and eliminates their move during 
transportation, so that there requires less investment in risk prevention and 
insurance. 
 
 Car Value vs. Total Logistic Cost 
In the BTS approach, it is cheaper to ship cars of value higher than USD 25,000 by 
RORO+Container style (Figure 19). While in the BTO approach, it is cheaper to 
ship cars of value no lower than USD 54,000 by containers (Figure 20). However, 
Hyundai cars global average selling price is only USD 15,000 (Hyundai Motor, 
2012), which means the major market of Hyundai is mid/low end market. Therefore, 
under the above premises, when considering the minimum total logistic cost, there is 
not much traffic economically suitable for container shipping. 
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Figure 19  Car Value vs. Total Logistic Cost under BTS (USD/car) 
  
 
Figure 20  Car Value vs. Total Logistic Cost under BTO (USD/car) 
 
 
 Export Volume vs. Total Logistic Cost 
Bigger shipping volume lowers the total logistic cost per car. As bigger volume means 
stronger negotiation power, for example if the annual export increases to 200,000 cars, 
the car maker tends to obtain discounted rates in almost every aspect of the logistic chain, 
including ocean shipping, trucking and storage, regardless of shipping mode. Therefore 
the unit cost decreases against bigger volume, but the turning point of transport mode 
opting will not be affected significantly. However, it is not easy for container lines to 
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accommodate huge volumes in one lot, e.g., a 1,000 cars shipment in a volume of more 
than 500TEU from one single POL. It will cause huge pressure on space allocation 
especially during peak seasons, as the space might have to be reserved for other 
shippers. 
 
5.2.4 Summary 
 
From the perspective of Hyundai Motor, although the container mode shortens the lead 
time, considering the total logistics cost it is less competitive than the RORO modal in 
either BTS or BTO. This is mainly due to the high inland trucking cost resulting from 
the lower scale economy level. If the container trucking cost is difficult to reduce, the 
container ocean freight rate pricing could be vital to its competitiveness in total cost. On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that cars of high value and strict lead time requirements 
are more suitable for container shipping, because the inventory holding cost of those 
cars are so high that they are extremely sensitive to the length of transit time. Moreover, 
if taking the customer waiting cost into account, yet difficult to quantify, the result of the 
container modal is believed to be improved.  
 
5.3 Cost Analysis from the Container Line’s Perspective 
 
5.3.1 Objectives 
In this section, based on above Hyundai Motor case study, the range of competitive 
ocean freight rate for container shipping is determined. Then another case study is 
launched from the perspective of CSCL to analyze the feasibility of investing in the car 
rack system and starting the containerized car shipping service on the Asia-Europe trade. 
The conclusion will be drawn from the evaluation of the NPV, IRR and pack-back 
period of the investment against the estimated range of the ocean freight rate.  
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The reason why choosing CSCL is because the company is the 7th largest container 
shipping line in the world by fleet capacity (Alphaliner, 2014), operating nearly 80 
service loops covering more than 180 ports in over 60 countries and regions around the 
globe (CSCL, 2014). CSCL has been the innovator in containerized car shipping 
business in China domestic trade since 2010. By the end of 2013 it has successfully 
carried 43,400 cars for manufacturers as General Motor, Volkswagen, BMW, Nissan and 
Haima (Mao Z. , 2014). However, the service has not been extended to the overseas 
markets yet. 
 
5.3.2 Evaluation premises 
 
 Ocean Freight Rate Estimate 
The adoption of ocean freight rate (estimated income of the project), is crucial to the 
evaluation results. Based on the Hyundai Motor case study, we assume that there are 
only three variables: Container Ocean Freight Rate per car (C), PCTC Ocean 
Freight Rate per car (P) and Car Value (V), influencing the total cost, while other 
costs are all fixed. When the total logistics cost of container modal equals that of 
RORO modal, we can obtain below two equations under BTS and BTO 
respectively. 
 
Equation 1  C=P+1.4V/365-96.826 (BTS) 
Equation 2  C=P+1.5V/365-222.25 (BTO) 
 
If the PCTC ocean freight rate keeps stable at USD700/car for WB (West Bound), 
and the car value equals Hyundai’s average selling price USD15,000 per piece, the 
container ocean freight rate will be USD660/car (USD2640/40’HC) in BTS and 
USD539/car (USD2156/40’hc) in BTO. Assuming Hyundai’s BTO portion only 
accounts for 10% of total deep sea traffic from Asia to Europe, then the weighted 
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container ocean freight rate will be USD648/car (USD2592/40’HC). Therefore,  
USD648/car is the inflection point to judge the competitiveness of the container 
modal. Similarly, the inflection point of EB (East Bound) container freight rate can 
be determined as well. However due to the low container freight rate in EB market, 
around merely USD700 per 40 foot box, if charging more than USD300/car 
(USD1200/40’HC), the shipper will not use car rack system, but simply pay 
USD700 to load 2 cars into one 40 footer. Therefore for EB rate, we fix it at 
USD300/car (40% lower than PCTC market rate). In this case, USD648/car for WB 
and USD300/car for EB can be considered as the maximum or ideal ocean freight 
rates to charge for the new service.  
 
However considering the potential price competition from car carriers, the container 
ocean freight rate is not expected to stand still. In order to stay competitive in 
certain target market, container rate is projected to be highly correlated with the 
PCTC rate. Therefore theoretically the identification of the cost of running a PCTC 
is crucial to determine the bottom level of price competition.   
 
A PCTC Asia-Europe round trip takes about 90 days. Last year the fleet utilization 
averaged 84% and time-charter rates for 6,500CEU capacity vessels averaged 
USD25,000 per day (TradeWinds, 2013). Heavy fuel consumption for such vessel is 
about 48 tons per day. Taking bunker price as USD630 per ton, Suez cannel transit 
fee as USD120,000, all port disbursements and agency fee as USD300,000, the 
round trip average unit running cost of a 6500CEU PCTC is estimated to be  
USD433/CEU (Table 12). While for a typical 14000TEU container ship on this 
route, the average unit cost is about USD700/TEU (USD350/car) for both WB and 
EB. 
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Table 12  6500CEU PCTC Unit Running Cost 
Asia-Europe Round Trip 
 
Item Amount 
Vessel Capacity (CEU) 6,500  
Round Voyage Time (days) 90  
Time Charter Rate (USD) 25,000  
Bunker Price (USD/ton) 630  
Bunker Consumption (ton/day) 48  
WB Space Utilization 85% 
EB Space Utilization 80% 
Short Leg Volume (CEU) 2,000  
Suez Cannel Transit Fee (USD) 120,000  
Port Disbursements (USD) 280,000  
Agency Fee (USD) 20,000  
Average Cost per CEU (USD) 433  
 
Note: Diesel cost, variable cost not included. 
Source: data from CSCC, (TradeWinds, 2013), (Suez Cannel 
Authority) 
 
Assuming that a car carrier will not operate under this break-even level, the bottom 
freight rate of container service can be drawn a bit lower than that in order to 
compensate the deficiency in inland trucking, at averagely USD400/car 
(USD1600/40’HC) for both WB and EB. 
 
 Total Investment 
Assuming at the first stage CSCL is going to purchase 1000 sets of car racks to 
launch Asia-Europe containerized car shipping service, with an average weekly 
capacity of 100 sets (200 cars). Each set of the rack costs about USD1200 
(Donaldson, 2014). It will also cost totally USD200,000 for the training to use the 
new equipment. So the total investment is USD2,600,000, with no loan from the 
bank. 
 
 Car Rack Residual Value 
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The car rack has a life of 8 years based on 6-7 rotations per year, and the residual 
value is about USD 100 after 8 years’ service (Donaldson, 2014). 
 
 Car Rack Rotation 
The evaluation will be based on the concept of round trip, which means the car 
racks need to be re-utilized as much as possible on both directions of Asia-Europe 
trade, e.g., on the west bound for Korea export, and on the east bound for Germany 
export. As an Asia-Europe round trip container service usually takes about 80 days, 
we assume that in the beginning 2 years each rack can be used for 2 round trips 
every year, and from year 3 to year 8 each can be used for 3 round trips. 
See complete Premises and Assumptions (Table 13) 
 
Table 13  Car Rack System Investment Premises and Assumptions 
 
Items 
Amount   
(in USD) 
Car Rack volume (sets) 1,000  
Car Rack Price / set 2,400  
Total Car Rack Investment 2,400,000  
Training Fee 200,000  
Total Investment 2,600,000  
Debt Capital 0  
Discount Rate 10% 
Residual / set 100  
Corporate Income Tax 25% 
Car Rack Life 8 years 
Max WB Ocean Freight Rate / car 648  
Max EB Ocean Freight Rate / car 300  
Min Round Trip Ocean Freight Rate / car  400 
 
5.3.3 Evaluation results 
 
 Project Acceptable against Ideal Freight Rate 
Applying the ideal container freight rate drawn from Hyundai’s case, and all the 
costs estimated from the empirical study of CSCL, the result of the evaluation turns 
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out to be in decent return. Till the end of the 8
th 
year, the NPV from investing per set 
of car rack is USD1370. The IRR is 19%, and it takes 5.32 years to recover the cost 
(Appendix A). 
 
 Project Unacceptable against Bottom Freight Rate 
Applying the estimated bottom ocean freight rate, the result is unacceptable, 
because the NPV and IRR turn out to be negative (Appendix B). 
 
5.3.4 Summary 
 
From the perspective of CSCL, the investment in containerized car shipping on the 
Asia-Europe route is risky. On the one hand, the return in the ideal situation is not 
attractive enough. On the other hand, the cost cannot be covered if competing against 
PCTC’s breakeven freight rate.  
 
There are three main factors that can be concluded influencing the return of the 
investment, freight rate, rotation and ship running cost. In the Asia-Europe trade, though 
the freight rate level is high, the slow rotation of car rack due to the long distance 
restrains the yearly total income, and the high ship unit running cost greatly offsets the 
limited earning too. Therefore investment in shorter distance routes where equipment 
rotation is faster and unit running cost is lower could be more profitable, even though 
with a lower freight rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
6. Suggested Marketing Plans for China Shipping 
 
Although the case studies prove that the total outbound logistic cost for part of the 
vehicles of high value from Asia to Europe is lower in the container modal, there is still 
doubt that if the carmakers are motivated enough to change to container modal or shift 
enough volume on to the container ships. That will directly affect the investment return 
of the container shipping line. In this chapter, a SWOT analysis is carried out to evaluate 
the competiveness of CSCL to launch the container car shipping service, and a 
marketing plan is suggested to the China Shipping Group Company.  
 
6.1 SWOT Analysis 
 
6.1.1 Strengths 
 
 CSCL has expertise in containerized car shipping. It started the service in the China 
domestic market in 2010 by providing door-to-door service supported by the car 
rack system. Therefore, it is not a brand new area for the company, but an expansion 
to overseas markets. So far, among global carriers, only Maersk and CMA CGM 
have project teams in the automobile sector. It is not too late for CSCL to enter. 
With the experience in operation and the understanding of the finished automotive 
logistics industry, the company can quickly adopt itself to the new market. 
 
 CSCL has 3 affiliated feeder companies covering Yangtze River Delta and Pearl 
River Delta in China as well as South East Asia ports. It also owns dedicated 
terminals in 12 major sea ports along the coast of China. Therefore, compared with 
foreign based shipping lines, CSCL has predominance in the Chinese market in 
terms of space guarantee, service connectivity and equipment availability.  
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6.1.2 Weaknesses 
 
 The container modal has a disadvantage in accepting huge volumes in a single call. 
For example, CSCL allocates space to all the ports of loading, and each POL usually 
works against the assigned allocation. If there is a huge car shipment loaded from a 
port, it probably squeezes the number of slots assigned to other ports. In particular 
when the car shipment is not regular, it may cause space waste in the slack seasons, 
and heavy pressure in the peak seasons.  
 
 CSCL, like all other shipping lines, despite its cost efficiency in ocean shipping, 
does not have competitive advantage in land transportation over the specialized car 
carrier trailers. If providing container door-to-door service, the trucking cost is 
estimated to be higher than the RORO modal. Although the container can deliver the 
new cars in a protected environment at a faster speed, these merits are yet to be 
justified by the extra inland cost. 
      
 Compared with car carriers’ close ties with carmakers, the connection between the 
company and car manufacturers is much looser. CSCL serves as a common carrier 
for all range of general goods, while car carriers are highly dependent on finished 
vehicles. Sometimes, even the car carrier fleet is financially backed up by the car 
manufacturers. Therefore, it will be difficult to break through such a close 
partnership and share the market with car carrier companies. 
 
6.1.3 Opportunities 
 
 The finished automotive shipping market is a huge market, while container lines 
have just stepped into this new field. The total automotive seaborne trade is 
projected to exceed the historical height of 22.4 million units this year, while 
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possibly the new cars carried by containers is only around 0.7 million, equal to 
about 0.5 million TEUs (Donaldson, 2014).  
 
 In spite of the huge total market volume, there is a growing trend in the increasing 
share of emerging economies. For example, exports from China, India, Thailand, 
Turkey, and imports to China, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, have all experienced rapid 
growth in recent years. The total seaborne car trade volume of those emerging 
countries is remarkable, but it is fragmented and widely scattered. This is the 
favorable trend towards the container shipping sector, because the smaller volume 
of car shipments can be well served by the container services of higher sailing 
frequency to various destinations, and most importantly in a cost efficient way. 
 
 There is increasing demand in container car shipping to some destinations where the 
volume is not large enough for RORO vessels to cover, or where there is no RORO 
facility.  
 
 China is the biggest automotive market in the world measured by both production 
and sales. In 2013, the figures reached 22.12 million and 21.98 million respectively 
(China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 2014), and the seaborne trade 
volume stood at 1.06 million for import and 1.1 million for export (Clarkson 
Research Services, 2013). Nearly all the major manufacturers have had their 
production facilities in place to feed the market locally, but they do not export their 
China made vehicles to overseas markets. The Chinese brands such as Geely, Chery 
etc. are the dominant export forces, mainly to the Middle East, South America, 
North Africa, Russia and India, while the imports are from the traditional auto 
producing countries such as Japan, Germany, the USA and South Korea. As a 
Chinese shipping line, such a big home market provides the company with great 
opportunities to benefit from its growth.  
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 The RORO shipping market connecting China with the overseas destinations is 
monopolized by foreign carriers. However, it is an opportunity for Chinese 
container lines. After China’s entry into WTO, three major Japanese car carriers 
established joint ventures with three state-owned shipping companies in order to 
have the licenses to operate in its coastal market. As a matter of fact, the joint 
ventures are actually dominated by the foreign party. Take China Shipping Car 
Carrier Company as an example, it only acts as a bareboat leaser, but the fleet is 
operated by K-Line. Now the foreign car carriers are not only authorized to operate 
in China, but rule the overseas routes connecting China as well. Ministry of 
Commerce of China recommended the strategic cooperation of building a national 
PCC fleet for the sake of the development of China automotive industry. However, 
due to the absence of commitment from Chinese carmakers and the lack of 
experience and resources in RORO shipping, the shipping companies yet have not 
taken actions.  
 
6.1.4 Threats 
 
 The whole finished automobile distribution system was not designed according to 
the container logistics modal. Most of the carmakers are comfortable with the 
conventional RORO modal and prefer to keep the old style of outbound logistics. 
Although the cost per unit carried by container ships is decreasing every year, the 
RORO modal is much more mature and regulated after decades’ practice. It is not 
likely to change overnight what people have been used to for ages to a new 
unfamiliar way of doing business.  
 
 Car carrier companies have more insight and sensitivity to the car shipping market. 
They have already noticed the change of the global seaborne car trade, and started 
adjusting the current service networks to cope with the emerging markets. For 
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example, K Line will appropriately respond to new customer needs resulting from 
this new trade pattern and the diversification of existing trends. In order to meet the 
demand of RORO cargo, the company will make full use of his network including 
container sector in addition to the car carrier services ("K" Line, 2012). NYK also 
pointed out that earnings through ocean transport would be difficult due to the 
reduction in deep sea demand and increase in diversified short sea services. Hence, 
they would invest more in shipping related logistic services to strengthen their 
competitiveness (NYK, 2013).   
 
 Some container lines have already entered into container car shipping market. For 
example, in 2006 Maersk started a project using Trans-Rak equipment to ship five 
Lotus Elise cars in one 40ft high-cube box from UK to US (Min & Jianhua, 2007). 
The company also encouraged car shipping to Latin America by using NORs 
(Non-Operational Refrigerated containers), which usually have to be sent back from 
Asia empty. Another leading shipping line CMA CGM has been carrying shipment 
of Chinese carmaker BYD since 2006 to reach markets such as Middle East, Africa 
and South America. Recently the carrier signed new contract with BMW for its 
export from Antwerp (Malcolm, 2010). Safmarine similarly drove the rise of 
containerized car shipping in South Africa, by using the boxes carrying car parts 
from Europe, which had difficulty in finding return cargo after unloaded.  
 
 Competing container lines have bigger fleets and service coverage than CSCL. 
Although CSCL ranks No.7 in the world by carrying capacity, the gap between it 
and the tops ones is huge. In addition, shipping lines are working in the form of 
alliances, such as 2M, CKYHE and G6. Shipping lines in the same group can share 
space on their partners’ services. Therefore, even the smaller company has a wider 
service coverage than before. There is great possibility that CSCL will team up with 
CMA CGM and UASC to compete with the others, but it is still difficult to 
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differentiate itself from other shipping lines.  
 
6.1.5 Summary 
 
Through the above SWOT analysis, it is found that CSCL, as an individual container 
line, is not competitive enough in the face of both competitors from the RORO and 
container sectors. The major deficiency is the sailing frequency and service coverage, 
which is supposed to be the most significant advantage over RORO shipping. However, 
a single container line is not able to distinguish itself in those aspects and could be 
struggling to attract enough cargo to support its car shipping investment. Instead, there 
had better to be a platform that can provide the facilities for containerized car shipping, 
consolidating the demand from various car makers, and matching them with available 
services supplied by all the container lines in the market. Such a platform can be 
performed by CSL (China Shipping Logistics Co., Ltd). 
 
6.2 Market Segment and Target Market 
 
CSL is a company under the direct administration of China Shipping Group. Based on 
the networks and resources of the mother company, it is able to provide integrated 
logistics service closely related to container shipping around the globe. However, its 
strength mainly lies in the Chinese market. Therefore, to start containerized car shipping, 
the company needs to decide which market segment to target and what strategy to 
implement.  
 
6.2.1 Market segmentation by trade routes 
 
According to the trade routes, the global car shipping market can be generally divided 
into three categories, East-West, North-South and regional trade. East-West is the 
traditional car shipping route dominated by RORO carriers. North-South and regional 
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are those trades mainly related to emerging economies. According to the characteristics 
of each market, the segment attractiveness is estimated (Table 14). Regional trade turns 
out to be the most attractive one, followed by North-South. This is mainly due to the 
higher growth rate of seaborne car trade in the developing countries and the 
competitiveness of container services in terms of frequency and coverage between those 
countries. 
Table 14  Market Segmentation by Trade Routes 
 Segment 
Attractiveness 
Factor 
Weight 
Parameters East-West North-South Regional 
High     
10-7 
Med       
6-4 
Low       
3-0 
Sore Total Sore Total Sore Total 
Profitability 35 >15% 10-15% <10% 3 1.05 5 1.75 4 1.4 
Volume Growth 25 >10% 5-9% <5% 0 0 4 1 8 2 
Size 15 >100 33-100 <33 5 0.75 3 0.45 3 0.45 
Competitiveness 20 High Med Low 4 0.8 5 1 6 1.2 
Seasonality 5 Low Med High 5 0.25 5 0.25 5 0.25 
Total 100         2.85   4.45   5.3 
Note: 
East-West trade incl. Transpacific, Asia-Europe/Mediterranean, Transatlantic 
North-South trade incl. Australasian, East/West Coast South American, South/West African 
Regional trade incl. Intra-Asia, Intra-EU etc. 
 
6.2.2 Market segmentation by car value 
 
Similarly a segment attractiveness analysis is carried out by car value. Cars of high value 
turn out to be the most attractive segment (Table 15). Compared with the RORO modal, 
containers are believed to better in meeting the demands of expensive cars, as their 
inventory holding cost could be greatly reduced through fast quality delivery by 
containers. 
Table 15  Market Segmentation by Car Value (in USD) 
 
Segment 
Attractiveness 
Factor 
Weight 
Parameters 
Unit Value   
<15,000 
Unit Value  
15,000-30,000 
Unit 
Value >30,000 
High     
10-7 
Med       
6-4 
Low       
3-0 
Sore Total Sore Total Sore Total 
Profitability 35 >15% 10-15% <10% 3 1.05 5 1.75 7 2.45 
Volume Growth 25 >10% 5-9% <5% 7 1.75 4 1 5 1.25 
Size 15 >100 33-100 <33 5 0.75 6 0.9 3 0.45 
Competitiveness 20 High Med Low 3 0.6 5 1 8 1.6 
Seasonality 5 Low Med High 7 0.35 5 0.25 3 0.15 
Total 100         4.5   4.9   5.9 
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6.2.3 Market segmentation by car dimension 
 
Based on the empirical study of loading cars with the support of Trans-Rak’s R-RAK 
system, cars can be categorized into five segments, ranging from six to two cars in one 
40ft high-cube container. For example, six Toyota Aygo L3415xW1615xH1465 (mm) 
can be fitted into one box; five Hyundai i10 L3566xW1595xH1550 (mm) into one; four 
Volkswagen Passat CC L4796xW1852xH1422 (mm) into one; three BMW 5 Series 
L4907xW1860xH1464 (mm) into one and any two of the common large cars, SUVs and 
MPVs can be loaded into one 40ft high-cube box (Table 16). The result shows that mini 
cars suitable for the ‘6 in 1’ mode scores the highest, closely followed by ‘5 in 1’ and ‘4 
in 1’. Cars that can only fill the box with less than 4 are relatively less attractive to the 
container modal.   
 
Table 16  Market Segmentation by Car Dimension 
 
Segment 
Attractiveness 
Factor 
Weight 
Parameters 
6 in 1 5 in 1 4 in 1 3 in 1 2 in 1 
Toyota Aygo Hyundai i10 
Volkswagen 
Passat CC 
BMW 5 
Series 
Larger Cars / 
SUV / MPV 
High     
10-7 
Med       
6-4 
Low       
3-0 
Sore Total Sore Total Sore Total Sore Total Sore Total 
Profitability 35 >15% 10-15% <10% 9 3.15 7 2.45 5 1.75 3 1.05 1 0.35 
Volume Growth 25 >10% 5-9% <5% 5 1.25 6 1.5 7 1.75 3 0.75 7 1.75 
Size 15 >100 33-100 <33 4 0.6 6 0.9 9 1.35 5 0.75 4 0.6 
Competitiveness 20 High Med Low 8 1.6 7 1.4 6 1.2 3 0.6 2 0.4 
Seasonality 5 Low Med High 5 0.25 5 0.25 5 0.25 3 0.15 3 0.15 
Total 100         6.85   6.5   6.3   3.3   3.25 
 
6.2.4 Target market 
 
Based on the analysis of market segments and the strength of CSL, the company needs 
to focus on regional trade connecting the Chinese market, e.g., imports from Japan and 
South Korea, and exports to South East Asia, India and the Middle East. The transit time 
between these markets are comparatively short so that the turnaround time of the 
specialized car racks can be reduced. Return cargo is also an important factor that cannot 
be overlooked, which helps increase the utilization of the racks.  
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The result of segmentation by car value and dimension seems to be contradictory, as 
high value cars are usually big and small cars are normally of low value. However, CSL 
should give an equal weight to both of them. Because high value cars bear higher 
inventory holding cost so that they tend to require fast and protected container services, 
and small cars can be attracted by the efficient loading solutions that may greatly reduce 
the unit shipping cost. Therefore, both cars of high value and high loading efficiency can 
be the target markets for CSL. 
 
6.3 Marketing Strategy 
 
6.3.1 Niche marketing strategy 
 
Container car shipping today only has a tiny share of the total seaborne volume. Though 
car carrier lines have noticed the growth in the container sector, it is still negligible to 
them. On the other hand, some car makers are showing growing interest in the container 
solution (Cross, 2012). This provides a good opportunity for the container sector to start 
investing in such a growing niche market. 
 
CSL should enter this market before it is too late, and implement a nicher’s strategy, 
starting from forming partnerships with Chinese auto exporters, such as Geely, Chery 
and BYD. Since the market has great potential in growth, when the container solution is 
widely recognized by the carmakers, and when the automotive industry finds its way 
through to a comprehensive BTO approach, CSL can expand its customer base to more 
foreign carmakers.  
 
6.3.2 Marketing mix 
 
 Product / Customer wants and needs 
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Providing fast and damage free containerized finished vehicle logistics services 
from end to end. 
Integrating comprehensive and value added services such as customized loading 
plans, customs clearance, PDI, loading/unloading supervision, carrier management, 
cargo tracking and final mile delivery. 
Prioritizing CSCL’s Intra-Asia, Australia, Middle East and Red Sea services and 
using other services in the market as alternatives. 
 
 Price / Cost 
Pricing by car unit instead of by container. 
Closely following RORO shipping ocean freight rate and other related costs. 
Contracting long term freight rates with container shipping lines as well as other 
suppliers. 
Being attractive in total logistic cost. 
 
 Promotion / Communication 
Advertising on the media specializing in automotive logistics. 
Paying regular visits to carmakers to dig out their wants and needs, and promoting 
container solutions. 
Using social networks and platforms to interact with potential users and the public. 
 
 Place / Convenience 
Appointing account managers in CSL headquarter in Shanghai. 
Setting up local supporting teams in ports in Asia, Australia, the Middle East and 
Red Sea area. 
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7.  Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
The container way of automobile shipping is not really new, but it is mainly applied for 
shipping secondhand vehicles due to the small volume, diversified flows and volatility in 
shipping demand of secondhand vehicles. For new car shipping, the RORO used to be 
considered as the only right way to go. However, today the new car seaborne trade too, 
is partly converted into a more fragmented style as a result of the growing demand from 
the emerging economies and scattered production sites around the globe. Thus, container 
shipping finds its opportunity in the field of new cars shipping. 
 
Based on the results of this research, in the traditional East-West car shipping routes, 
container modal so far has not been appealing enough to carmakers. Firstly, the RORO 
logistic chain is so mature that the total logistic cost is kept low and operations are well 
regulated. Secondly, the majority of deep-sea car traffic follows the BTS approach, so 
that the merits of short transit time, smooth intermodal transport and door delivery of 
container shipping are not well appreciated. However, in some emerging trade lanes 
where there is a constant but small shipping demand, while limited RORO shipping 
service and handling facilities are available, the container solution can be the default 
choice for car shipping. 
 
Supported by the innovative designs of car containerization facilities, a standard box 
now can accommodate more vehicles in an easier, safer and more cost efficient way than 
ever before. When there is an ocean leg involved, the container modal today is not 
inferior to the RORO modal in terms of the total logistic cost. Thanks to the economy of 
scale of container ocean shipping, its deficiency in inland transportation can be 
compensated. Besides, the container modal can provide a faster door service that enables 
a damage free delivery with shortened lead time, which increases the attractiveness to 
the carmakers. Moreover, on the one hand, the cost of container shipping is decreasing 
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every year, while that of RORO shipping is increasing. On the other hand, the auto 
industry has been trying hard to move towards the BTO approach, indicating an 
increasing demand in door delivery. Therefore, the competitiveness of container modal 
is expected to be significant in the future, especially when the auto industry breaks 
through its bottle neck to new production approaches. However, as long as vehicles are 
massively produced according to sales forecast, RORO will remain the major way of car 
shipping by volume. 
 
It is always better for a service provider to identify an opportunity and enter the market 
earlier than the competitors. China Shipping Group should take advantage of its 
strengths in container shipping and network worldwide to launch the container car 
shipping service as an NVOCC. A niche marketing strategy can be adopted by starting 
from its home market for Chinese auto exports, and then expanding its customer base 
step by step. Though CSL will not be the earliest comer to the field of auto shipping, it 
can benefit from the experiences of the pioneers and mature technologies now available 
in the market. Maersk can be set as an example in that way. It was nobody in the 1970s 
when Sea Land and others led the industry, but later it determined and devoted all its 
strengths in this sector, learning from competitors but differentiating itself from them.  
 
For China Shipping there is great possibility to become one of the leading companies in 
the container car shipping sector as well. A five-year action plan can be set up for CSL to 
start the container car shipping service. In the first year, equipment (e.g. 200 sets for the 
first phase), trained technical staff, and dedicated marketing and equipment control 
teams should be in place. Before that, marketing campaigns to all Chinese car exporters 
need to be carried out to figure out the existing and potential trade routes and volume. 
The total logistic cost of each route compared with the RORO modal should be studied 
for the sake of competitive pricing and possibly trial shipment should be started. From 
year 2 to year 3, the service is projected to officially get started. In the meantime, the 
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customer base needs to be expanded, especially for overseas return cargo. From year 4 to 
year 5, expansion should be kept up and more attention should be paid on optimizing the 
services and benefits. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Cost-Benefit Evaluation of Car Rack Investment (max) 
USD/set 
Far East / Europe Trade 
Year 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
Income   3,792  3,792  5,688  5,688  5,688  5,688  5,688  5,688  
WB Voyage   2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  
WB Ocean Freight Rate per TEU   1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296  
EB Voyage   2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  
EB Ocean Freight Rate per TEU   600  600  600  600  600  600  600  600  
Cost   4,622  4,562  4,557  4,556  4,559  4,565  4,575  4,587  
Running cost per TEU   3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  
Depreciation   138  138  138  138  138  138  138  138  
Maintenance   100  110  121  133  146  161  177  195  
Reposition   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  
Administration   100  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Marketing   100  80  64  51  41  33  26  21  
Storage   50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Others   50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Profit   (830) (770) 1,132  1,132  1,129  1,123  1,113  1,101  
Corporate Income Tax   (207) (192) 283  283  282  281  278  275  
Net Profit   (622) (577) 849  849  847  842  835  825  
Depreciation   138  138  138  138  138  138  138  138  
Residual                 100  
Cash Inflow   (485) (440) 986  987  984  980  972  1,063  
Cash Outflow 1,400                  
Net Cash Flow -1,400  (485) (440) 986  987  984  980  972  1,063  
Cumulative Cash Flow -1,400  -1,885  -2,324  -1,338  -351  633  1,612  2,585  3,648  
Discount Rate 0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  
Discounted Net Cash Flow -1,400  -441  -363  741  674  611  553  499  496  
Discounted Cumulative Cash 
Flow 
-1,400  -1,841  -2,204  -1,463  -789  -178  375  874  1,370  
 
NPV 1,370  
  
  
  
  
IRR 19% 
Static Payback Years 4.36  
Dynamic Payback Years 5.32  
 
Note: 
1.Ocean Freight Rate exclude THC and local surcharges both ends 
2.Assuming one car rack with two cars in one TEU 
3.Running cost per TEU is based on 14000TEU vessel's FE/Europe round trip cost  
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Appendix 2 Cost-Benefit Evaluation of Car Rack Investment (min) 
USD/set 
Far East / Europe Trade 
Year 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
Income   3,200  3,200  4,800  4,800  4,800  4,800  4,800  4,800  
Round Trip   2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  
Round Trip Average Ocean 
Freight Rate per TEU 
  800  800  800  800  800  800  800  800  
Cost   4,622  4,562  4,557  4,556  4,559  4,565  4,575  4,587  
Running cost per TEU   3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  3,984  
Depreciation   138  138  138  138  138  138  138  138  
Maintenance   100  110  121  133  146  161  177  195  
Reposition   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  
Administration   100  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Marketing   100  80  64  51  41  33  26  21  
Storage   50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Others   50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  
Profit   (1,422) (1,362) 244  244  241  235  225  213  
Corporate Income Tax   (355) (340) 61  61  60  59  56  53  
Net Profit   (1,066) (1,021) 183  183  181  176  169  159  
Depreciation   138  138  138  138  138  138  138  138  
Residual                 100  
Cash Inflow   (929) (884) 320  321  318  314  306  397  
Cash Outflow 1,400                  
Net Cash Flow -1,400  (929) (884) 320  321  318  314  306  397  
Cumulative Cash Flow -1,400  -2,329  -3,212  -2,892  -2,571  (2,253) (1,940) (1,633) (1,236) 
Discount Rate 0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  
Discounted Net Cash Flow -1,400  -844  -730  241  219  198  177  157  185  
Discounted Cumulative 
Cash Flow 
-1,400  -2,244  -2,974  -2,734  -2,515  -2,317  -2,140  (1,983) (1,798) 
 
NPV -1,798   
  
  
  
IRR -15% 
Static Payback Years 
 
Dynamic Payback Years 
 
 
Note: 
1.Ocean Freight Rate exclude THC and local surcharges both ends 
2.Assuming one car rack with two cars in one TEU 
3.Running cost per TEU is based on 14000TEU vessel's FE/Europe round trip cost  
 
